The purpose of this paper is to show how repression, the funda mental cause of the neurosis, can be explained in the light of the principles of Thomistic rational psychology. Such an explanation seems to be more satisfactory th an th a t of Freud. To establish this, we will begin with a brief exposition of F reud's position.
I. THE FREUDIAN POSITION ON MAN'S MENTAL STRUCTURE
In order to explain the Freudian notion of repression, it is nec essary to give a synopsis of F reud's concept of m an's m ental structure. Freud distinguished three basic elements in this structure, namely, the id, the ego, and the super-ego; although he did not consider them to be distinct powers or faculties. 1 The id is the m ost fundam ental element of the structure, the ego and super-ego being merely its extensions. The id is the unconscious, unknown source of the instinctual drives. I t is governed by the pleasure principle, seeking satisfaction of these drives regardless of any demands made by external reality. The repressed is p a rt of the id and is cut off from the ego by the resistance of repression.
The ego, an extension of the id, is the " surface" of m an's mental structure. Although unconscious elements are present even in the ego, it constitutes w hat m ay be called m an's conscious self. B y its connection to the system of perception, the ego comes into contact with the external world and as a result is guided by the reality prin ciple. The modification introduced by this influence is w hat essen tially distinguishes the ego from the id proper.
The ego serves as a m ediator between the id and the external world. I t seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and tries to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id. Since the ego controls m otor activity which m ust be utilized if the drives of the id are to attain their goal, the ego can act as a repressive factor.
According to Freud, the ego represents reason and common sense in contrast to the id, which is the source of the passions. He compares the relationship of the ego and the id to th a t of a rider and his horse. Although the rider controls the horse to a certain extent, a t times he is forced to go where the horse desires.
The super-ego is the last p a rt of the mental structure to come into existence. I t is an extension of the ego, b u t m aintains a close relationship to the id and is less firmly connected to consciousness th a n the ego proper.
The origin of the super-ego lies in the individual's first and most im portant identification, his identification with his parents, principally with his father who is taken as a model. Through the super-ego, parental influence is given lifelong expression. As the child matures, the fathers's role is carried on by teachers and others in authority. Even in later years, their instructions and prohibitions remain power ful in the super-ego and exercise moral censorship in the form of conscience. Although accessible to later influences, the super-ego always preserves the characteristic derived from its parental origin, namely, its capacity to dominate the ego. As the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the super-ego. I t is generally a t the command of the super-ego th a t the ego carries out its repressions.
The tension between the demands of the super-ego and the actual performances of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt. B ut the super-ego's independence of the conscious ego and its link w ith the unconscious id make possible an unconscious sense of guilt. The ideals of the super-ego can to a great extent remain unconscious and inaccessible to the ego, and there is often communication between the super-ego and unconscious instinctual impulses.
II. THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF REPRESSION
H aving considered F reud's analysis of m an's mental structure, we m ay now proceed to an explanation of his theory of repression. I t is not surprising th a t F reud's theory of repression, based as it was upon clinical observation, should have evolved over the years.
In an early work entitled Repression1 w ritten in 1915, Freud states th a t the essence of repression lies simply in the function of rejecting something and of keeping it out of consciousness. R e pression occurs when the satisfaction of an instinct, which in itself is pleasurable, would be irreconcilable w ith other claims and purposes. Thus, it would cause pleasure in one p a rt of the mind and pain in another. If the desire to avoid pain is greater than the desire for gratification, the instinctual impulse meets a resistance which seeks to impede it.
Repression occurs in two stages. The prim ary stage excludes from consciousness the m ental presentation of the instinct, i.e., the image representing the object which aroused the impulse. The sec ondary stage consists in an extension of the repression to include m ental derivatives of w hat has been initially repressed. In other words, any closely associated images or trains of thought are likewise repressed and thereby rendered unconscious.
However, repression does not hinder the repressed impulse from continuing to exist in the unconscious and from exerting an influence in the individual's m ental life. Moreover, being withdraw n from conscious influence, repression proceeds to the secondary stage, in cluding more and more derivatives in the repressed m aterial. The impulse itself, cut off from the attainm ent of its natural goal, may find expression in bizarre forms.
An im portant aspect of F reud's theory is th a t repression is not event th a t occurs once, b u t a continuous process. Since instincts are continuous by nature, the repressed impulse keeps straining tow ard its goal. Consequently, m aintaining the repression requires a cons ta n t expenditure of energy, and if this were to cease the repression would fail.
Since Freud did not clarify his views on the structure of the mind until 1923 in his work The "Ego" and the " Id, " we do not find these distinctions applied to his initial explanation of repression. However, in his work Inhibitions, Symptoms and A n xiety,1 w ritten in 1926, they appear prominently.
In the latter work, Freud states th a t repression occurs when the ego, perhaps a t the command of the super-ego, refuses to consent to an instinctual impulse proceeding from the id. As a result, the impulse is inhibited and cannot follow its natural course.
Because of its connection with the perceptual system and the resulting phenomenon of consciousness, the ego exerts considerable influence over processes in the id. The ego receives stimuli not only from the external world, b u t also from within, and it endeavors by means of the resulting sensations of pleasure and pain to direct the course of m ental events. W hen the ego is opposed to an instinctual process in the id, it has only to utilize the pleasure principle which governs the id and give a " signal of unpleasure" in order to attain its aim.
Just as the ego controls the p ath to action in regard to the external world, so it controls access to consciousness. In repression it exercises its power in both directions, on the one hand acting upon the instinctual impulse itself impeding the attainm ent of its goal, and on the other, upon the image arousing the impulse.
Repression is an indication of the strength of the ego, b u t also of its weakness. If the ego succeeds in protecting itself from a dangerous instinctual impulse through the process of repression, it has certainly inhibited and damaged the particular p art of the id concerned; but it has at the same time given the id some independence and has renounced some of its own sovereignty. For the repressed material m aintains its existence outside the organisation of the ego and inde pendently of it. The ego loses control over this impulse which is then free to influence m ental life unchecked. This is inevitable from the nature of repression, which is, fundamentally, an attem p t a t flight.
Thus far, Freud has merely developed his theory of repression as stated in his earlier work, b u t Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety contains two im portant innovations. One is the recognition th a t repression does not necessarily involve relegating something to the unconscious. Freud had been led to this conclusion because his early observations were limited to the hysterical neurosis, where this is indeed the case. He found th a t the perceptual content was for gotten and debarred from being reproduced in memory. B ut later, when he became familiar with obsessional neuroses he found th a t pathogenic occurrences are not always forgotten. Because of this discovery, the distinction made earlier between the conscious and the unconscious was diminished in importance.
A second notew orthy innovation regards the origin of anxiety. Earlier, Freud had been of the opinion th a t anxiety is the result of repression, i.e., th a t the energy of the repressed impulse is trans formed into anxiety. B ut a further study of phobias enabled him to see th a t anxiety is the cause of repression, not its effect. The ego experiences anxiety because of the instinctual demands of the id and as a result initiates the repression.
III. CRITICISM
Although F reud's discovery of the mechanism of repression was an indispensable contribution to the understanding of the neurosis, his explanation of repression leaves much to be desired.
We do not find in F reud's writings a clear distinction between rational and sensory powers, b u t he attributes to the ego certain characteristics of a rational power. Nevertheless, the ego cannot simply be equated w ith a rational power in the Thomistic sense, for Freud considers the ego to be merely a portion of the id.
Difficulties arise when we consider th a t m an's rational nature demands subordination of his sensory powers to reason. If this is so, why should conflict between the ego and the id result in repression and the consequent production of a definitely pathological sta te ? Furtherm ore, everyone experiences a t times rational opposition to certain sensory inclinations. Yet, such resistance does not usually result in a neurosis.
As we have seen, we cannot solve these difficulties by stating th a t repression results only when something is pushed out of consciousness.
(10)
In fact, it seems th a t there are no satisfactory answers to such ques tions in the Freudian system. I t appears th a t w hat is needed to clarify these obscurities is a more adequate concept of m an's nature and of the distinction among his powers, a concept such as th a t found in the philosophy of St. Thomas. Here we find clear distinctions between knowing and appeti tive powers, between rational and sensory powers, and even between two sensory appetites, the concupiscible and the irascible.
IV. A THOMISTIC EXPLANATION
St. Thomas explains the instrum entality of the irascible appetite with regard to the concupiscible appetite, indicating how the emotions of the irascible appetite rise and term inate in the emotions of the concupiscible appetite and serve to overcome obstacles to the attain m ent of its goal.1 Both sensory appetites are subject to reason, which enjoys a " political" rule over them through the operation of the cogitative sense.2 This is the natural and normal functioning of these powers, and this order m ust be preserved if man is to m aintain his emotional well-being.
A clue as to how such distinctions can legitimately be applied to explain repression m ay be found in F reud's contention th a t anxiety is a cause of repression. Now anxiety is a type of fear, and fear is an emotion of the irascible appetite. I t is clear th a t w hat is sought by the concupiscible appetite because it is seen as a good m ay a t the same time be feared by the irascible appetite, if from another point of view it is considered an evil.
If this conflict is resolved through rational control, i.e., by the application of a rational judgment, the process is entirely normal because in accord with m an's rational nature. B ut if the concu piscible appetite is denied its object solely or prim arily on the basis of the emotion of fear, this am ounts to repression; for one emotion is blocking another, and this is unnatural. By such a procedure, the irascible appetite has usurped the directive function which is the prerogative of the rational powers.
I t is in the light of these principles th a t D r. Anna Terruwe, a D utch psychiatrist, explains repression in term s of a conflict between emotions of the two sensory appetites. This conflict usually results in the suppression of a concupiscible emotion by an irascible em otion. 3 This explanation is well in accord with observations made by Freud. I t accounts for the fact th a t true neuroses originate in child hood, for a t this time rational control is weak a t best, and the child is governed by his emotions. I t explains F reud's contention th a t the ideals of the super-ego, such as moral precepts, m ay exert a repressive influence. This may well happen. The child's difficulty in under standing such m atters in a rational fashion m ay lead to adverse emo tional reactions. The remedy, of course, is not to eliminate moral instruction, b u t to exercise care in the presentation of such precepts to children.
Lastly, an explanation in term s of Thomistic principles furnishes greater insight into the pathological character of the neurosis. As Freud had observed, the repressed emotion, although impeded from attaining its natural goal, continues to exist in a state of endless striving. Such a state of unrest does not occur when n atural rational control is exercised. Although the sensory appetites are only imper fectly subordinated to reason, the application of rational considerations enables the eventual resolution of any conflict between the sensory appetites and the rational powers. I t is only the unnatural suppres sion of one emotion by another th a t results in a pathological condition.
B ut there is another factor which contributes to neurotic tension. The repressing emotion is generally an emotion of the irascible appe tite, and as St. Thomas explains,1 the irascible emotions are by nature mobile. Since the purpose of the irascible appetite is to overcome difficulties in the attainm ent of good and in the avoidance of evil, the irascible emotions find their natural term ination in concupiscible emo tions. An irascible emotion always tends tow ard something else; it never denotes rest. Now in the neurosis the repressing emotion m ust constantly exert pressure in order to m aintain the repression. This means th a t it, too, cannot follow its natural course. Hence we see th a t the tension and unrest characteristic of the neurosis has a twofold source.
From w hat has been said, it is clear th a t the neurosis is the result of a serious disorder among m an's faculties. N ot only has the repress ing emotion usurped a prerogative of the rational powers, b u t the very mechanism of repression renders impossible any subsequent rational control over repressed material. M oreover, if the repressing factor is an irascible emotion, as is generally the case, there is a further disorder inasm uch as the irascible appetite is by nature m eant to serve as an instrum ent of the concupiscible appetite. On the sensory level, prim acy belongs to the concupiscible appetite.
In conclusion, the fruitfulness of the application of Thomistic principles to an understanding of the neurosis is evidenced by the clinical work done over a period of several years b y D r. Terruwe. N ot only was she able to distinguish two different repressive factors in obsessive compulsive neuroses, namely, fear and energy (courage), 1 . Cf. Ia Ilae, q.25, a.i. and to discover a third type of neurosis which she named the fear neurosis camouflaged by energy, b u t also to devise a specific m ethod of treatm ent for each type.
